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CHAPTER 36
Imagination and Film
Jonathan Gilmore
IntroductIon
This discussion will address some of the explanatory virtues and limits of con-
temporary theories of the imagination in our understanding of films. We will 
begin with a preliminary sketch of the general tenets of those theories, which 
are largely drawn from cognitive psychology, and then turn to their use in 
addressing such topics as the role of the imagination in our learning of what 
facts hold within a fictional film, including what characters’ motivations, beliefs, 
and feelings are; how our perceptual experience of an actor enters into the 
visualizing of the fictional character he or she plays; how films exploit the imag-
ination to generate certain affective and evaluative responses; and how such 
responses compare to those we may adopt toward analogous circumstances in 
real life. We will not discuss the creative imagination, that is, the discovery of 
original techniques or contents.1 Rather, our discussion will be oriented around 
what has been called the recreative imagination, when our imaginative activity 
is guided by and responsive to the prescriptions to imagine that typify our 
engagement with film.2
1 Gaut (2003a).
2 Currie and Ravenscroft (2003).
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cognItIve theory of the ImagInatIon
Recent philosophical and empirical literature on the imagination addresses its 
role in a vast range of activities, from playing games, fantasizing, dreaming, 
hallucinating, manipulating symbols, problem-solving, planning for the future, 
performing thought experiments, inquiring into metaphysical possibility, wish-
ing, remembering, empathizing, adopting another person’s point of view, to, 
of course, responding to works of art. It’s disputed whether a univocal concept 
of the imagination can serve in such diverse explanatory contexts. Here, I will 
describe just those dimensions of the theory of the imagination about which 
there is both a good consensus and which are especially relevant to the philoso-
phy of film.
Described very generally, the imagination is a capacity to mentally represent 
something (an object, a state of affairs, an event, etc.) where one’s representa-
tion need not be counterfactually dependent on any independent state of its 
target. A dominant line of thought identifies such representations in functional 
terms: imaginings, like other mental states such as beliefs and desires, are to be 
individuated from one another, not by their contents, but by the pattern of 
causal interactions they exhibit in our mental economy.3 For example, if I desire 
that p I will typically behave in ways, ceteris paribus, to bring p about; if I 
believe that p and I believe that if p then q then I will also typically believe that q. 
If I imagine that p, I may act in ways that are consistent with p being false. If I 
believe it’s a holiday, I’ll sleep late; if I only desire or imagine that it’s a holiday, 
I’ll get up for work. Here, imagining exemplifies a distinctive or sui generis type 
of mental attitude not reducible to other attitudes such as beliefs.4
Although there is no canonical set of the factors that would serve in all con-
texts to individuate imaginings from other kinds of mental states, some impor-
tant distinctions are as follows:
 1. Our imaginings are normally—although not exclusively—caused and 
constrained by our will, unlike occurrent beliefs and perceptions which 
depend much more on our other beliefs and perceptions.
 2. Connected to the previous point, beliefs, perceptions, and other factive 
mental states such as remembering are normatively characterized as 
“aiming” at what is true. Imaginings, by contrast, are not essentially con-
strained by the truth, even if in some cases they can be employed for 
truth-tracking purposes, as in thought experiments.5
 3. Given the presence of a motivational state such as desire or emotion, 
beliefs and other truth-apt states tend to have behavioral consequences 
that are not typical of imaginings sharing the same contents. If I desire to 
3 On functionalism about mental states, see Block (1996).
4 Nichols (2006, 8).
5 Velleman (2003).
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stay dry and believe it is raining, I will open my umbrella. If I only imag-
ine it is raining, no such action would be expected.
 4. Finally, imaginings, unlike beliefs, tend to be context-dependent.6 What 
I imagine depends on the particular circumstances that motivate and 
causally sustain the imagining: watching a film provokes one set of imag-
inings, reading a novel, planning a trip, and daydreaming provoke differ-
ent imaginings. By contrast, beliefs tend to be context-independent: 
once formed, if suitably connected to my other beliefs, they remain stable 
elements in what I believe. That imaginings are not combined to form a 
single generally applicable stock makes it possible to imaginatively repre-
sent many different states of affairs (say, the New York City of Marathon 
Man, Annie Hall, and Ghostbusters) without any impetus to reconcile 
their mutual inconsistencies.
Focusing on forms of imagination itself, one important distinction is 
between propositional imagining and sensory imagining. The first of these 
involves adopting a mental attitude of imagining toward some propositional 
content, as when one imagines that such and such is the case. As we will discuss 
below, such imagining exhibits a ready parallel to believing; indeed, some theo-
rists speak of this form as “belief-like imagining.” Sensory imagining, by con-
trast, involves an imaginative attitude toward some content that is of the kind 
that could be the object of perception. Just as I might see some object in my 
environment, I might “visualize” it in a self-generated way.
A distinct form of imagining—treated by some theorists as a third kind but 
by others as a subset of sensory imagining—is experiential imagining. To engage 
in sensory imagining of a cat in a tree is to form a visual mental representation 
of it. However, to experientially imagine the cat in the tree is to imagine my 
seeing it thus—to imagine what I visualize as belonging to my egocentric space. 
Such experiential imagining requires a sensory dimension, but also involves, at 
least implicitly, a commitment to the sensory experience belonging to oneself 
as one sees, hears, feels, and so on, whatever it is that is the content of one’s 
thought. We will return to what sort—sensory or experiential—best character-
izes our experience of film, but let us first discuss the more fundamental role 
imagination plays in coming to know what is true in the story a film represents.
fIctIonal truth In fIlm
One of the essential dimensions of our engagement with a film is determining 
what facts hold in the scenarios that it represents. Many theorists characterize 
this process as coming to understand what is “fictionally true” in a story, but 
this should not be taken to refer to a special kind of truth; rather, it only marks 
out a class of statements that are represented as true according to the story. 
6 Currie and Ravenscroft (2003, 18).
36 IMAGINATION AND FILM 
848
Some of what a film represents as true—say that the Empire State Building is 
in New York City—is indeed true, other things that the film represents as 
true—that King Kong climbs the Empire State Building—are not. Our deter-
mination of what is true in a film is conceptually prior to, and provides the 
grounds of, symbolic, allegorical, or other sorts of interpretations of the work 
that we may defend. However, there may in practice be a reflexive relationship 
between what we take to be true in a film and what interpretation of the story 
we find apt. At the end of Christopher Nolan’s Inception audiences are left 
unsure whether what Dom Cobb, the main protagonist, undergoes is the con-
tent of a shared dream. How we answer that question about what is factual 
within the story of the film and what interpretative meaning we attribute to the 
work may be internally related.
In principle, one could explain the discovery of much of what is proposi-
tionally true in a film without adverting to the imagination. One could, for 
example, determine that such and such is the case by reading a detailed plot 
summary or discovering that the work’s creators stipulated that some truth is 
held within its story. However, the perceptual truths within a cinematic fiction 
seem much less determinable independent of our imaginative engagement. For 
perceptual and experiential imaginings are much more inflected than proposi-
tional ones by dimensions of the vehicle of representation—such as the medium, 
technique, style, and tone—in and through which a film tells its story. The 
same natural setting can look soulless and forbidding or warm and inviting 
according to the color rendering of the depiction.
The procedures by which we discover such truths within the fictional world 
of a film parallel in many ways those by which we discover truths about the real 
world. (Note: in what follows “world of a film” is just a façon de parler refer-
ring to what is true according to the film.)
For example, just as inferences among our propositional and sensory beliefs 
can lead to new beliefs about the actual world, so such reasoning among our 
propositional and sensory imaginings of what is true in a fictional film can lead 
to new imaginings of what is true in it. We also tend to monitor departures 
from consistency among our imaginings in relation to a given story, just as we 
do with our beliefs, sometimes giving up what we thought was true when 
contradictory, but more reliable information emerges as a film narra-
tive unfolds.
However, no fictional story can represent all the facts that it asks us to 
entertain as true. Thus, much of what we know to be the case in a film is 
imported from our beliefs about the real world, such as beliefs about physics, 
human psychology, and how things look, taste, or feel. If a character is in 
London one day and New York the next, we assume without needing to be 
shown that he traveled by plane. Here, our everyday beliefs allow us to infer 
new imaginings of what is true in the fiction from the imaginings that we 
already have.
Beliefs that saliently contradict what a film asks us to imagine are not typi-
cally admitted into our inferences among those imaginings. For that would 
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result in our imagining contradictions to exist in even the most quotidian natu-
ralistic representations. Furthermore, we may hesitate to import certain beliefs 
into a fictional story if it represents a world highly dissimilar to the one we 
know. We are on shaky ground, for example, in attributing everyday psycho-
logical states to the pleasure trippers in Antonioni’s L’Avventura, who have an 
affectively muted constitution that seems to be significantly different 
from our own.
Imaginings, of course, are typically quarantined from playing a role in infer-
ences among our beliefs.7 One may concurrently imagine that p and believe 
that not p, without feeling any rational pressure to hold one of these thoughts 
to the exclusion of the other. Relatedly, what we imagine to be true does not 
tend to motivate the behavior that it would if we believed it.
There are also important asymmetries between our patterns of forming 
imaginings about a fictional world and beliefs about the real one. These are 
explained by the internal and external perspectives that, when conjoined, are 
exclusively applicable to the contents of fictional representations.8
We take the internal perspective when we refer to facts in the film that moti-
vate us to imagine certain other propositions as true within the story; we adopt 
the external perspective when we refer to factors outside the fictional content 
that perform that imagination-generating function. We might, from an internal 
perspective, explain that the protagonist exploring an abandoned house is in 
danger through appealing to facts within the story, such as the house being 
haunted; however, from an external perspective we can explain that fact through 
appeals to the conventions of the film’s genre and the eerie soundtrack that 
accompanies shots of the house’s exterior. In general, the external stance on a 
cinematic work explains its contents in terms of its identity as an artifact, with 
reference to the functioning of its plot, style, medium, tone, lighting, point of 
view, duration of shots, depth of focus, color, and other aspects of the vehicle 
of representation. The internal stance, by contrast, identifies the content of 
that representation as if it were real.
It isn’t always easy to determine whether a feature of a film that we note 
from the external stance makes a difference in the facts of the story considered 
from an internal stance. Two actresses, Carol Bouquet and Angela Molina, play 
the role of Conchita in Buneul’s That Obscure Object of Desire, alternating from 
one scene to another and sometimes switching places in the middle of a scene. 
Whether this phenomenon is to be imagined as a fact in the world the film 
presents, or recognized as only a feature of the cinematic representation of that 
world, is unclear.
In any case, only some grounds of what we determine to be true in a fiction 
lie within the scope of the operator “it is to be imagined that.” Other sources 
lie outside. We can usually assume, for example, that no one is seriously hurt in 
7 Gendler (2003).
8 For discussions of internal and external stances on a fiction, see Lamarque (1996), Chapters 2 
and 8, and Currie (2010, 49–64). An analogous distinction is noted by Walton (1979, 21).
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the wreckage caused by an automobile chase in a comedy. We make that 
assumption not because the film gives us any final tally of the damage but 
because bodily injury to bystanders would be inconsistent with the light- 
hearted aims of that genre.
In general, a fiction’s overt descriptions of what is true supply an opportu-
nity to make an indefinite number of potential inferences about what else is the 
case. That only a much smaller subset of mostly shared inferences are in prac-
tice activated in our engagement with a work is explained by how its descrip-
tions manage our attention and interests, making certain conjectures and 
conclusions relevant to us in our experience of the fiction.9 Indeed, a film can 
frame its contents in ways that divert us from inferences that would reveal 
inconsistencies in the story or potential explanations of events that compete 
with those that the film prescribes for us to imagine.
The preceding addressed how we recognize what is true within a film repre-
sentation. But what makes such things true? Some approaches treat truth 
within a fiction very broadly, so as to incorporate whatever would be true if a 
fiction were a veridical representation of actual events. (David Lewis suggests 
this approach in relation to literature but it can be adopted to film.)10 Here, 
what is true within a film (or other fiction) is conceptually prior to what an 
appropriate audience is elicited to imagine. But that kind of construal tends to 
mischaracterize our identification of what happens in a story. For it wrongly 
directs us to identify as true within a story many aspects of a film’s representa-
tional content that we are meant to ignore or at least not take as indicative of 
states of affairs within the film. For example, we would have to attribute a 
superhuman ability of visual recall to adult characters whose memories of their 
childhood are represented on screen. Or if we see an American actor’s measles 
inoculation scar in an epic set in the eighteenth century, we would need to 
imagine that he traveled back from the future. Other theories respond by nar-
rowing the scope of what counts as true within a representation, construing it 
as the product of an engagement wherein only certain dimensions of the fiction 
count as generating facts within it, while others are to be ignored. One approach 
that has gained widespread acceptance characterizes this engagement as involv-
ing a structured pretense akin to a game of make-believe. There, what is true 
in the fiction is identical to what audiences are prescribed to imagine in their 
engagement with it.
In Kendall Walton’s influential theory of fictions, works such as films, paint-
ings, and novels serve as props in such a pretense, what Walton calls a game of 
make-believe.11 A simple game of that sort is exemplified by children pretend-
ing to duel with wooden sticks as if they were swords. Some of the rules that 
9 Nichols (2006), cites some of the large empirical literature showing that differences among 
readers’ goals (e.g., entertainment or knowledge) in engaging with a narrative text explain differ-
ences in the kind and degree of inferences they make as they read. These findings can be general-
ized to all fictional works, including films.
10 Lewis (1978).
11 Walton (1990).
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structure this game may be formally agreed upon, but others may have a natu-
ralness in that context such that, without being explicitly stipulated, they 
 govern what counts as properly playing the game. If a stick breaks, so has the 
sword it represents. Walton proposes that all works of fiction, including films, 
can have analogous roles as props in more tightly constrained forms of pre-
tense, where, for example, we imagine seeing a visual recording of actors and 
studio sets, that we are witnessing actual events. Whereas the rules of a chil-
dren’s game are often ad hoc and readily revised, the rules that structure our 
engagements with works of art tend to be relatively stable. Among those rules, 
of course, are those specifying that certain features of a fictional representation 
(e.g., that the narrator has miraculous powers of recall) are not counted as facts 
in the make-believe world of the story.
As noted above, a standard part of the experience of any fiction is importing 
propositional and perceptual beliefs from our experience of the real world into 
our imaginative representation of the fictional world. In the case of a visual 
work of fiction such as a film, we may import elements of what we literally 
perceive on screen into the imagined visual representation that the film elicits. 
In some cases, we imagine of an actor that he is a character who looks very 
much like the actor himself, inheriting the latter’s beauty or charisma. In other 
cases, a fiction prescribes an imagining of perceptual features that depart from 
or are inconsistent with what we literally see represented. Dustin Hoffman was 
29 and Anne Bancroft 35 at the time of the filming of The Graduate but audi-
ences are not supposed to import that comparatively small difference in how 
old the actors appear into the film’s prescription that her character is (and 
could appear to be) twice his age. It is generally true of works of fiction that we 
import only some facts about the vehicle of representation into the content of 
the representation. But what is distinctive of works of fiction that essentially 
depend on perceptual properties of their vehicles is that there is often a ques-
tion of which features of what we see (or hear) belong solely to the work’s 
vehicle of representation and which are (also) to be attributed to the content 
of what the work elicits us to represent in our imagination. Let us now turn to 
some debates about the formal structure of that imaginative engagement.
the nature of the ImagInatIve experIence 
elIcIted by fIlm
In watching a traditional film, we are placed in immediate contact with a chang-
ing pattern of light projected onto a screen from a recording of actors pretend-
ing to be individuals who typically don’t exist in real life. However, the most 
natural way of describing this experience is to say that we see the characters that 
those actors play, the scenarios that constitute the film’s fictional content.
The imagination is widely acknowledged to play some role in this experi-
ence, but what role is that? There are two forms of visual experience here that 
need to be examined: the first concerns our tendency to see the shifting patches 
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of light and color as the objects and persons they serve to depict and the second 
is found in the tendency to see in the moving picture the fictional character, 
not the actor who plays him, or the fictional location, not that in which the film 
was made. Let us address these in turn.
The first form of visual experience exemplifies what Richard Wollheim has 
identified as the phenomenon of seeing-in.12 Seeing-in describes an experience 
common to all forms of depiction in which we see things in photographs, films, 
drawings, and paintings. In Wollheim’s characterization, the phenomenon 
involves a viewer both recognizing (in a minimal sense) what is depicted in a 
picture and being aware of the marked surface of the representation in virtue 
of which such depiction is achieved—a single experience composed of two 
parts that he calls twofoldedness. Some of Wollheim’s remarks suggest that two-
foldedness is a necessary condition of seeing-in. For without any conscious 
awareness of the surface, one’s experience is not as of a depiction but is rather 
taken to be as of the thing itself (e.g., in trompe l’oeil), and, without seeing the 
object depicted “in” the painting, one doesn’t have a depiction, only an abstract 
design.13 In any case, it is not clear that the imagination plays an essential role 
in seeing-in. Gregory Currie, for example, argues that recognizing what a cin-
ematic image represents depends on the same sub-personal, largely automatic 
processes that are involved in recognizing that thing in the flesh.14 My recogni-
tion of a train rolling toward me on screen involves the same subpersonal 
capacities (the activation of feature-detectors indexed to my concept of “train”) 
as recognizing a train in real life. I see an x in an x representation via the same 
capacities that allow me to see an x.
The kind of visual experience in which the explanatory power of appealing 
to the imagination is more likely indispensable is that which occurs once see-
ing- in has done its work: where we don’t just see the actor but see the actor as 
the person he portrays.
One proposal for how to describe the connection between these two forms 
of experience—seeing-in and visually imagining would be to say that we first 
literally see the actor in the pattern of light project on a screen and only subse-
quently imagine of that actor that he or she is the fictional character. That may 
occur sometimes, especially in cases in which we are not yet absorbed in an 
ongoing imaginative experience. But a more typical experience is one in which 
such literal seeing and sensory imagining are reflexively related. Once I am 
engaged in an imaginative exercise, my perceptual attention will be directed 
both by dimensions of that experience, for example, what features are relevant 
to the story, and by dimensions that are external to the fictional world (such as 
lighting, focus, point of view, music, and mood) that affect what I find salient in it.
12 Wollheim (1980).
13 Another characterization would be that he sees twofoldedness as a normative requirement on 
seeing a depiction as a depiction. It is a norm that is not constitutive of, for example, the proper 
perception of clouds, even though they can support seeing-in as well.
14 Currie (1995, 20).
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Is there a common formal structure of such content? One significant dispute 
is over whether, in our experience of film, all visual imagining is imagined see-
ing. Participation theorists argue that our imagining is of the experiential sort 
described in section “Cognitive Theory of the Imagination”: in watching a 
film, audiences imagine themselves seeing the events depicted. They imagine 
being part of the fictional story, an invisible or inert presence in the scene. 
Thus, George Wilson explains “[t]he spectator knows that he is in the theater, 
but it is make-believe for him that he is watching from within the space of 
the story.”15
Proponents of the participatory theory argue that we imagine seeing (and hear-
ing) what is presented as occurring in a film because, more generally, we imagine 
we are located in some sense in the space represented by the film—specifically, we 
are said to imagine occupying the position that is, in fact, occupied by the camera. 
A feature of films that contributes to the intuitive plausibility of this thesis is that 
the point of view we are given on the scenarios visually represented in a film is an 
internal part of the representation, independent of where we happen to sit in rela-
tion to the screen. From this, it is natural to assume our visual imagining of the 
film’s goings-on is identical to imagining seeing that content from that internal 
point of view.
Currie disagrees, arguing that except in unusual cases imagining in cinema 
is impersonal: viewers do not imagine themselves in sensory contact with the 
film’s represented content.16 His objection is that if visual imagining is always 
personal or participatory, this would result in our being forced to attribute 
absurd or impossible states of affairs to even the most mundanely naturalistic 
films. For example, if a shot is taken from a point of view of looking down on 
a bed, the participatory theory implies that we are to imagine ourselves as not 
only seeing the state of affairs thereby presented, but doing so while somehow 
suspended from the ceiling. Comparably, some events in a film are shown as 
occurring unseen by anyone; to impute a viewer into those contexts creates a 
contradiction—the event is both witnessed and unwitnessed; finally, although 
the point of view furnished by the camera seems a natural place to locate our-
selves within the film, the participatory thesis is hard to square with cases in 
which what we are presented is the point of view of a character—in which case 
we would be forced to conclude that it is true in the film that we and the char-
acter are co-located.
Walton’s general reply to such worries is the point noted above (section 
“Fictional Truth in Film”) that fictions may ask us to imagine something with-
out prescribing us to imagine all its causal or conceptual consequences. Also, 
most fictional representations make salient certain lines of inference at the 
expense of others that could in principle be followed, and our desires and inter-
ests in engaging with the fiction—which are motivated by the fiction—also 
15 Wilson (1986, 55–56). See also Walton (1990), Chapter 8; Levinson (1993); and Smith 
(1997).
16 Currie (1995), Chapter 6.
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shape which lines will be pursued. However, the nature of the dispute is not 
clear. Walton and Wilson appear to make a conceptual claim that depiction is 
necessarily imagined seeing, whether we are talking about depictions in paint-
ings, drawings, or films, whereas Currie argues just that it is exceedingly rare 
for the visualizing involved in the experience of a film to be imagined seeing. 
One point in favor of participatory imagining being contingent, if not rare, is 
that if we conclude that all visual imagining is imagined seeing, we are unable 
to explain why overt indications of participatory imagining seem to have sig-
nificant thematic import. If participatory imagining is a default mode of engag-
ing with a film, how are we to explain the distinctive kind of content it may play 
in a work such as Michael Haneke’s Caché, where audiences seem to be asked 
to imagine that they exist within the film’s fictional world voyeuristically fol-
lowing the goings-on of a justifiably paranoid couple through their window? If 
participatory imagining is constitutive of all visual imagining, this would 
implausibly render all such clandestine observations unremarkable.
affectIve response
We noted earlier three modes of imagining that films elicit from us: proposi-
tional, sensory, and experiential. Each of those forms presents a fictional world 
as being in a certain way. In doing so, they can make it true within the fiction 
that the grounds for a given emotion are present. To elicit anxious suspense in 
audiences, a film may foreshadow a potential disaster; to elicit pity in audiences, 
a film may show someone they care about suffering; to elicit disgust, a film may 
present a close-up view of exposed viscera or bodily contaminants. These are 
not merely responses triggered or caused by our confrontations with fictional 
films; rather, they instantiate evaluations of the states of affairs repre-
sented therein.
A plausible psychological explanation of why we respond emotionally to 
what we know to be fictional is that this tendency reflects a general capacity 
serving practical rationality to affectively respond to imagined representa-
tions.17 This mode of emotion elicitation via imagining might thus instantiate 
the way psychological systems can be exapted, or redeployed, to operate beyond 
the domain in relation to which they initially developed.18 Here, systems 
employed for the registration of the value of actual states of affairs may have 
widened their scope to realize the benefits of counterfactual thinking and from 
there come to serve the multifarious functions of fictions.
A discrete emotional response is directed toward a particular object (a per-
son, an event, a state of affairs) and presents that object as bearing qualities that 
would justify or explain the emotion—as fear presents its object as dangerous, 
sadness presents its object as being a significant loss, and so on. By contrast, 
moods, a distinct kind of affective response, are much more diffuse, exhibit a 
17 Damasio (1994). See also Harris (2000, 86–7); and Gendler and Kovakovich (2006).
18 Sterelny (2003).
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greater temporal (less episodic) extension, and seem to color one’s whole envi-
ronment with congruent qualities.19 Because they lack a particular object, 
moods tend not to have the force or vividness of ordinary emotions, but that 
global applicability allows them to have broad effects in shaping audience 
responses to any particular objects to which a work directs their attention.20 
Specifically, when a given mood is expressed by and elicited in audiences of a 
work of art, it lowers the threshold for the particular mood-consistent (directed) 
emotions a work is designed to provoke.21 Moods not only serve as a scaffold-
ing for the particular intentional or directional emotions that a work elicits—
lowering the threshold for their evocation—they also help sustain over time the 
attentional and informational processes that those emotional experiences 
depend upon.22 Feeling a given mood, one continually “discovers” grounds for 
and confirmation of the mood outside of oneself, a phenomenon exploited by 
filmmakers who, through setting a mood, can cause us to project some prop-
erty into some fictional scenario (e.g., a threatening presence) without directly 
visually or verbally describing that scenario as possessing that property.
Indeed, that such moods can be elicited by processes whose workings are 
outside of conscious awareness allows them to affect our evaluations and judg-
ments in ways that might not be possible if the grounds of those responses 
were cognitively assessed. Sound, lighting, and editing techniques of films, for 
example, can express and elicit moods that direct the attention of viewers to the 
film’s mood-congruent visual features, invoke mood-congruent expectations, 
and promote particular evaluations of characters.23 If a viewer is unaware of the 
source of these effects in the mood developed through such techniques, she is 
much more likely to attribute them to evaluative facts about the imagined 
states of affairs in the film. (A third source in the imagination of emotional 
responses—identification with characters—is discussed in section “Simulation 
and Identification”.)
Those who adopt a widely held pre-theoretical stance on emotions and 
moods—call them realists—take it for granted that both sorts of emotional 
responses are genuine. Indeed, substantial sources of emotional elicitation in 
empirical studies designed to probe real-world emotions are fictional films and 
stories.24 However, some philosophers—call them irrealists—argue against that 
assimilation of fiction-directed emotions to those based on beliefs, perceptions, 
and other factive attitudes.
All parties to the debate acknowledge that there are typically qualitative dif-
ferences between the emotion-like responses we have to what we take to be real 
19 Griffiths, Sizer argue for the predominant view that moods have no intentional objects.
20 For the role of moods in altering our attention to focus on those elements of a filmic represen-
tation that would fit with or justify the mood, see Smith (2003).
21 Ekman (1994).
22 On affective states as being experienced as giving information about objects in one’s situation, 
see Clore et al. (2001).
23 See Tan et al. (2007).
24 For illustrations, see Coan and Allen (2007).
36 IMAGINATION AND FILM 
856
and those elicited by fictional representations. Fear evoked by the refined tech-
niques of a horror film may be more powerful than that which is typically 
evoked by ordinary experiences. Grief over the death of someone one cares for 
in a fiction isn’t typically as long standing as sadness over a real friend. 
Furthermore, we may regulate or tamp down our emotions according to social 
norms and practical expediency, while giving full vent to them when—in the 
context of fictional entertainments—such social and practical demands are 
suspended.
Irrealists about fiction-directed emotions go further in arguing that our 
respective behaviors in response to fictions and facts are not different in quality 
or degree but different in explanatory kind. For example, that we know that 
the monster in the movie that provokes our fear is a fictional creature doesn’t 
just diminish our tendency to flee, it forecloses the relevance of any such moti-
vation. And whereas our grief over the loss of a real person seems to suffuse our 
thoughts and feelings about unconnected states of affairs, our grief over the 
death of a beloved protagonist in a novel is compatible with being full of cheer 
once our attention is directed away from the fictional representation.
In order to explain these, and other behavioral and affective asymmetries 
between our emotional responses to what we take to be real and what we know 
to be only imagined, irrealists argue that we must posit that the relevant feel-
ings we have in responses to fictions are, as a class, distinct from ordinary or 
genuine emotions.25 Irrealists acknowledge that genuine emotions can be pro-
voked by a work of fiction—as when the misogyny expressed in a novel leads to 
resentment toward its author. Yet they argue that those emotions that are felt 
in virtue of imagining that the contents of a work of fiction are actual are not 
literally experienced, despite often being accompanied by the standard physi-
ological and phenomenological dimensions of emotions prompted by what we 
take to be true. Instead, irrealists situate our experience of such fiction-directed 
emotions as within the pretense or imaginings that fictions elicit from us. It is 
part of our participation in a pretense involving the fiction’s contents that we 
make-believe we feel sad.
One argument advanced by irrealists is that there seem to be significant dif-
ferences between fiction or imagination-directed emotions and those based on 
beliefs with respect to such features as their respective motivational potential or 
behavioral effects. Pity felt for a person who is hurt in the real world tends to 
be accompanied by a motivation to help alleviate her suffering, even if other 
motivations forestall that concern from being acted on. Pity felt for a character 
in analogous circumstances within a play appears to carry no such motivation.
One problem with this distinction is that if the motivation in question is a 
conscious desire, the distinction between the presence of such motivation in 
the real-world case and its absence in the fictional case can be explained by the 
fact that desires depend on relevant beliefs to be acted on, and there is no such 
25 The case for such pretend or “quasi-“emotions was introduced by Walton (1978).
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belief in the fictional case.26 That is, we don’t need to posit a different kind of 
affective state operative in the fictional and real cases in order to explain their 
different motivational character; we can appeal instead to a difference in the 
accompanying beliefs. Alternatively, if the motivation in question can be identi-
fied with an unconscious desire-like state, it is not clear that it is absent in the 
fictional case. A widely studied phenomenon is how imaginatively representing 
one’s own or another’s behavior initiates activity in brain regions that are 
engaged when actually performing the analogous behavior: we exhibit a motor 
readiness to act in a way consistent with the behavior that we merely imagina-
tively represent.27 Also, a belief with some content and an imagining with that 
content may not entrain similar behavioral or affective consequences because of 
the influence of other beliefs and content bearers, as well as motor routines, 
behavioral scripts, and other inhibitory factors that constrain the affective and 
behavior-generating output of our imagining.28
In any case, contra the irrealist’s assumption, spectators who are absorbed in 
experiencing fictions may indeed feel motivated to perform actions congruent 
with the emotions those fictions elicit. As Susan Hurley notes, “movements can 
be induced by actions you actually perceive or by actions you would like to 
perceive – as when moviegoers or sports fans in their seats make movements 
they would like to see.”29 As we watch the characters in a film try to find their 
way out of some fix, we don’t (typically) shout to them from our seats, but we 
may make judgments about where, within the fictional scenario, they ought to 
seek recourse, scanning the scene, for example, to see where they can take shel-
ter. No doubt, such behavior can sometimes be classified as part of the activity 
of understanding the content of the fiction. Yet, the process of making such 
judgments is a kind of helping behavior, the only sort available to audiences 
excluded from the fictional world.
Peter Goldie notes that with fictions we “allow ourselves to a considerable 
degree to indulge our profound feelings for humankind, and let our sentiments 
run away with us without concerns about their connection to action.”30 The 
implication is that with respect to fictional representations we allow ourselves 
to experience emotions that we would inhibit, because of their behavioral con-
sequences, if the representations were of real things. But that doesn’t describe 
a distinction between emotional responses to fictions and to real life so much 
as emotional responses that would justify relevant actions and those that would 
not. When there are no behavioral consequences to our emotions this may not 
be because they are directed at fictions but because acting from those emotions 
can serve no point.31 One might be appalled by the treatment of enslaved 
26 Carruthers (2006).
27 Munzert et al. (2009).
28 The hypothesis here is that the inhibitory mechanism that prevents acting from the motor 
preparation is generated in parallel with the preparation for motor activation. Lotze et al. (1999).
29 Hurley (2008).
30 Goldie (2003, 62).
31 Gaut (2003b).
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people one reads about in a historical representation, but that feeling, even 
though directed at real individuals, can no more motivate behavior to alleviate 
their condition than can emotions felt for fictional characters lead to actions 
that would help them.
Realists thus point out that there is something unsatisfyingly ad hoc about 
treating emotions that are fiction-directed as only pretend in virtue of their lack 
of behavioral effects, when emotions directed at the contents of a wide range 
of other sorts of representations that don’t have motivational potential, or for 
which actions would be beside the point, are uncontroversially counted as gen-
uine.32 This point can be generalized to say that emotions may be supported or 
partly constituted by mental attitudes other than belief. Fantasies, desires, 
anticipations, perceptions, acknowledged hallucinations, and, most relevantly 
here, thoughts that need not be truth apt such as imaginings can serve to rep-
resent an emotion’s target.
sImulatIon and IdentIfIcatIon
One important dimension attributed to our capacity to imagine counterfactual 
states of affairs is the role it plays in understanding other people’s minds. 
Simulation theorists argue that understanding someone else’s experience 
sometimes involves imaginatively representing their beliefs, desires, percep-
tions, and other mental states, as if they belonged to oneself. Because we share 
with others similar ways of processing the contents of such mental representa-
tions, we can imaginatively entertain having another’s beliefs and desires and 
discover from those inputs to one’s theoretical and practical reasoning mecha-
nisms what outputs in behavior are likely to result.33 Although initially posited 
as an explanation of how we can predict the behavior of others, simulation 
theories are often appealed to in explanations of our ability to discover and 
imaginatively experience others’ emotions. The proposal is that I do not typi-
cally become aware of a person’s affective state solely through inferential rea-
soning about her beliefs and desires. Rather, I also, or instead, more directly 
just imagine having her beliefs and desires and can attribute to her the emo-
tions or other states that this process generates in me “offline,” that is, discon-
nected from their usual behavioral consequences.34 Unsurprisingly, such 
simulation theories have been posited to explain how we understand the 
thoughts, behaviors, and emotions of fictional characters as well.35
Critics of simulation as an explanation of our understanding of fictions do 
not claim that it never occurs. Rather, they argue that its scope is limited. First, 
simulating the minds of fictional characters, unlike simulating those of real 
32 Moran (1994).
33 Some representative treatments are Heal (1995); Gordon (1995); and Goldman (2006).
34 The alternative “theory-theory” places greater stress on our reliance on a tacit body of knowl-
edge of how people think. See the papers collected in Carruthers and Smith (1996).
35 See Feagin (1996), for an application of this approach to literature.
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persons, seems cognitively onerous in ways that would limit its prevalence: for 
I must not only imagine that what I see on the screen or read in the novel rep-
resents some real state of affairs, I must also imagine what it is to be in the 
shoes of those characters whose existence I must entertain as part of the larger 
imaginative project. Second, we can plausibly account for much of what we 
know of a character’s thoughts and feelings in a film from descriptive informa-
tion the work provides about the mental state of the character and via infer-
ences from what the character says and does. We may also come to understand 
the mental state of a character, as well as predict her behavior, because we rec-
ognize in the fictional state of affairs reasons she would have for those thoughts 
and behaviors we attribute to her. Finally, as noted above, some of our knowl-
edge of what is true in a fiction, including how a character thinks and behaves, 
comes from our familiarity with the genre, style, period, and so on, to which 
the work belongs. One can typically predict that when a film features a babysit-
ter hearing strange noises coming from the attic, she is unaccountably not 
going to flee the house.
There are other notions of identification with fictional characters that draw 
on the imagination but do not presume the explanation of our knowledge of 
other minds favored by simulation theory. One is the proposal that our identi-
fication with a character is not a global imagining of being the character or 
occupying her situation in all respects but rather partial and aspectival. Here, to 
identify with a character may be to imagine sharing only one or some of her 
dimensions: for example, her perceptual experience but not necessarily her 
beliefs or her feelings.36 A point-of-view shot, for example, invites us to percep-
tually identify with a fictional character, but that identification (as in shots from 
the killer’s perspective in horror films) need not entail that we identify with the 
character in other respects, such as his desires.37
A related notion of imaginative identification posits that it gives us not only 
knowledge of how a character feels, but a similar experience of those feelings 
themselves. In a process that is sometimes identified with empathy, one’s imag-
ining of oneself in the shoes of another—including a character within a  fiction—
can lead to feeling what the other feels. As Shelley Duvall’s character flees Jack 
Nicholson’s in a hedge maze in The Shining, we don’t only fear for her but with 
her, responding with the racing pulse, shortness of breath, and greater skin 
conductance that, no doubt, the character undergoes according to the fiction. 
Sometimes, such affective identification can induce us to adopt a character’s or 
narrator’s emotional appraisal of what his circumstances require (say a mob-
ster’s need to eliminate his rivals) even when the facts in the story would not 
justify that evaluation if the circumstances they describe were real.38
36 Gaut (2010, 258).
37 For criticisms of point-of-view shots as constituting an identification with the relevant fictional 
character, see Currie (1995, 174–6), and Smith (1995, 157).
38 Gilmore (2011).
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A critic of such notions of simulation and identification who sought an alter-
native explanation of such emotions could point to the phenomenon of affec-
tive contagion, an automatic, largely unconscious, tendency to mimic 
expressions, postures, and movements with those of another person, which 
leads to a sharing of the other’s affective state.39 Such mimicry has been shown 
to be reliably caused by exposure to a wide range of emotional responses such 
as laughter, embarrassment, and disgust and is especially salient in relation to 
facial expressions of the emotions.40 Such subdoxastic mimicry is particularly 
effective in eliciting emotions from film spectators, as our visual experience of 
the face of an actor on film can be significantly similar, with respect to emo-
tional contagion, as the experience of perceiving a person in the flesh.41
If such motor mimicry were merely a case of a spectator adopting the physi-
cal appearance of a target in a given emotional state, it would not be relevant 
to explaining the actual triggering of emotional feelings among audiences. 
However, performing such motor mimicry can cause, or at least prime, one to 
experience the emotions of one’s target, even when one is unaware of their 
source. That point distinguishes such mimicry from the more self-aware pro-
cesses of identification involved in empathy and simulation.42
The apparent low-level, automaticity of emotional contagion makes it pos-
sible for a work to evoke affective reactions, and their concomitant evaluative 
perspectives, that may conflict with conscious and more reflective affective 
responses. As Goldie notes, “what is typical of contagion is that the agent is not 
aware of the contagion: the agent takes his experience as original and not as 
caught from another.”43 This means that, when “infected,” one may look for, 
and end up identifying, the putative justification of one’s emotion in some state 
of affairs, even though the emotion is arationally caused.
Of course, empathetic identification can explain only some of the emotions 
we experience in watching a film. For often our emotional responses do not 
match those of the character with whom we putatively empathize: he feels 
wildly optimistic about the plan, we feel wary of its pitfalls. Indeed, there our 
imagining would not be central or participatory but acentral—an imagining 
from the outside.44 In such a case the proponent of imaginative identification 
as a source of emotions may observe that our wariness is felt in virtue of our 
recognition of the character’s optimism, and it is that latter feeling that is gen-
erated empathetically. However, other emotions we may feel for a fictional 
scenario are sufficiently decentered that they may not refer to any particular 
emotions of characters in the fiction.
That the contents of a story are amusingly grim may be due to the mordant 
way it is framed or represented, not to the feelings of any individual  represented 
39 Hatfield, et al. (1992).
40 Dimberg et al. (2000).
41 Coplan (2006).
42 Adelmann and Zajonc (1989). See also Cacioppo et al. (2010).
43 Goldie (2002, 191).
44 On central and acentral imagining, see Wollheim (1984, 74).
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therein. We can thus laugh at the physical torments of a character in a comedy 
but feel revulsion if we were to learn of them occurring to a real person. For 
facts in a scenario that are criterial for one kind of emotion can be highlighted, 
while those criterial for contrary emotions can be diminished.45 Determining 
what a film expresses about its contents involves attending to the particular 
form in which that content is represented—for example, grimly, parodically, 
disgustingly, joyfully, and so on. It need not involve imagining having the atti-
tude of some other real or fictional person, except perhaps in the sense that in 
experiencing that content in accord with the emotional perspective made 
salient by the film, we may imagine possessing an evaluative outlook highly 
alien to our own.
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